Gramsci as a Spatial Theorist. by Jessop, Bob
GRAMSCI AS A SPATIAL THEORIST 
Bob Jessop 
 
This contribution argues that Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis involves the 
spatialization as well as historicization of its analytical categories.  but also their 
spatialization. These theoretical practices are also deeply intertwined in his “absolute 
historicism”. This argument is useful not only because Gramsci regularly explores 
geographical themes but also because ‘bending the stick in the other direction’ 
enriches our understanding of his overall approach. I do not claim that Gramsci was 
a geographer manqué or was more a geographer than historian. These are 
disciplinary questions inappropriate to the pre-disciplinary traditions of Italian 
philosophy and historical materialism and to the political agenda of Italian state 
formation. Conversely, while it is certainly appropriate to consider, like Said (2001),1 
the import of Gramsci’s familiar spatial metaphors, it would be misleading to focus 
exclusively on these here. For this would divert attention from Gramsci’s less 
obvious but more significant analyses of the inherent spatiality as well as temporality 
of social relations. This approach had significant practical as well as theoretical 
implications and is my primary focus here. 
 
Spatializing the Philosophy of Praxis 
 
Gramsci writes that, while everyone is an intellectual, not everyone is an intellectual 
by social function (1971: 9). One might add that, while everyone has a practical 
sense of place, space, and scale, not everyone is a geographer by social function. 
This certainly holds for Gramsci himself. He was a deeply spatial thinker but he did 
not explicitly prioritize spatial thinking. This may explain both why Gramsci ‘did not 
fully and explicitly develop his geographical insights’ (Morera 1990: 89) and why the 
inherently spatial nature of his thought has been neglected. But he did take 
geography seriously in various ways. He studied it alongside his major subject of 
philology at Turin University (passing his geography exam in 1912). He 
recommended its teaching in primary schools together with reading, writing, sums, 
and history; and that a potential textbook for party education contain a ‘critical-
historical-bibliographical examination of the regional situations (meaning by region a 
differentiated geo-economic organism) (Gramsci 1985: 691). He continued to explore 
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geology, geography, and geo-politics after leaving university and also taught history 
and geography in prison following his arrest (Hoare and Smith 1971: CD189, 171; 
Gramsci 1985: 325, 272). He noted the mass popularity of geographical novels 
(1985: 590, 617ff); and recommended that Touring Clubs promote national culture by 
combining geography with sport (1995: 288). He reflected on the geo-political and 
geo-economic implications of the International Conferences in the 1920s for Italy, 
Europe, internationalism, and future world politics. And, more generally, he often 
approached political problems not only in terms of ‘structural’ factors but also in 
regional terms (cf. Morera 1990: 149), 
 
These interests reflect his experiences as a Sardinian in the most exploited and 
oppressed part of the Mezzogiorno (Southern Italy) and his movement to Turin, the 
capital city of Piedmont and the North’s industrial centre. They also derive from his 
reflections on more general influences in Italian economic, political, and cultural 
development. These include the Vatican’s role as a cosmopolitan mini-state situated 
at the heart of Italy supported by a traditional intellectual elite with a long-established 
supranational orientation managing for the leaders of Europe; the long-running 
debate on the Southern Question in Italy (especially following the 1870s); the 
spatiality of the Risorgimento and the flawed nature of an Italian unification process 
dominated by the Piedmontese state; the continuing economic and social problems 
posed by uneven development, dependent development, and, indeed, internal 
colonialism in Italy; the communists’ political problems in breaking the class alliance 
between northern capital and the southern agricultural landowning class and in 
building an alliance between the northern workers and southern peasants; the 
changing nature and forms of imperialism (including the obstacles, challenges, and 
opportunities involved in the diffusion of Americanism and Fordism in Europe); and 
the problems for the wider communist movement posed by the Soviet Union’s 
international isolation.  
 
Gramsci’s university training in philology under Umberto Bartoli also stimulated his 
spatial sensibilities. He followed the latter’s new approach to linguistics as an 
historical science concerned with the social regularities of language (Gramsci 1985: 
174, 551). Bartoli developed a “spatial” analysis of language that sought to trace 
“how a dominant speech community exerted prestige over contiguous, subordinate 
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communities: the city over the surrounding countryside, the ‘standard’ language over 
the dialect, the dominant socio-cultural group over the subordinate one” (Forgacs 
and Nowell-Smith 1985: 000). He also charted the continuing flow of innovations 
from the prestigious langue to the receiving one, such earlier linguistic forms would 
be found in a peripheral rather than central area, an isolated rather than an 
accessible area, a larger rather than a smaller area” (Brandist 1996: 94-5). Gramsci 
inflected Bartoli’s analysis in a strongly materialist direction and highlighted its 
practical implications. For he saw the problem of revolution as closely tied to the 
unification of the people – something that had to pass through the medium of 
language if a coherent collective will was to emerge that could unify different classes, 
strata, and groups (cf. Helsloot 1989: 561). The resulting complexities are evident 
from Gramsci’s analyses of how language use is stratified (e.g., how countryfolk ape 
urban manners, how subaltern groups imitate the upper classes, how peasants 
speak when they move to the cities, etc.) (1975: 2342). In short, there is a strong 
sense of spatiality in Gramsci’s work on language as a medium of hegemony (Lo 
Piparo 1979, Ives 2004), 
 
These influences suggest, as remarked earlier, that there is more to Gramsci as a 
spatial theorist than his use of spatial metaphors (on which, see box one). The latter 
have certainly been influential in the reception of his work but we should also 
consider his interest in the actual rather than metaphorical spatiality of social 
relations and practices, in their spatial conditioning, and in their relevance to spatial 
issues. For Gramsci was not only sensitive to the historical specificity of all social 
relations (Morera 1990: 85) but also to their distinctive location in place, space, and 
scale. Indeed these two are clearly interconnected. Thus I now consider how 
Gramsci integrates place, space, and scale in his philosophy of praxis. However, 
because he does this in a largely pre-theoretical manner, these concepts must be 
defined before illustrating their significance for Gramsci’s theory and practice. 
 
___________________ 
Box One about here 
                                                 __________________ 
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Place (or locale) refers to a more or less bounded site of face-to-face relationships 
and/or other direct interactions among relevant social forces. As such, it can be more 
or less extensive depending on whether such interactions require the co-presence of 
named individuals or representative individuals or can be mediated through 
delegates from relevant organizations or movements. It is generally closely tied to 
everyday life, has temporal depth, and is bound up with collective memory and social 
identity. Its boundaries serve both to contain and to connect: they provide a 
strategically selective social and institutional setting for direct interactions and also 
structure possible connections to other places and spaces on a range of scales. The 
naming, delimitation, and meaning of places are always contested and changeable 
and the coordinates of any given physical space can be connected to a multiplicity of 
places with different identities, spatio-temporal boundaries, and social significance. 
Gramsci was sensitive to all of these aspects. The importance of place is stressed in 
his reflections on folklore, common sense, popular culture, and political practice. It is 
also illustrated in his discussion of built forms (schools, churches, architecture) and 
even street names (references). Gramsci also noted the contestability of places, their 
intertwining with other places, and their links to memory, identity, and temporality 
(Gramsci 1971: 00-00; 1978: 00-00). Thus Gramsci was interested in folklore 
because it was characteristic of the subaltern and provincial classes and opposed to 
official conceptions of the world – it was one way in which subaltern classes 
rationalized and survived in the world (Landy 1994: 175). Likewise, he explored the 
social origins of intellectuals in relation to their roots in specific places and spaces 
rather than in a-spatial class terms. For example, he distinguished between the 
social functions of northern (industrial, technical) and southern (rural, organic) 
intellectuals in building different types of hegemony (1978: 454-5); and observed that 
traditional Italian intellectuals had historically played a cosmopolitan rather than 
national role (1985 205). In other situations, intellectuals and political parties could 
also be the relays of ideas ‘borrowed from other national sources’ rather than 
develop an authentic and inclusive national-popular culture (1985 205). Gramsci also 
argued the social bases of economic policies and strategies -- laissez-faire, laissez-
passer could not be rooted in agriculture but only in commerce and strong industry. 
And his analysis of the Southern Question (see below) attaches great significance to 
the rootedness (or otherwise) of social classes and political and intellectual forces in 
specific places, spaces, and scales.  
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 Space comprises the socially produced grids and horizons of social life. It offers a 
whole series of strategically selective possibilities to develop social relations that 
stretch over space and time. Gramsci considers space from several viewpoints: (a) 
the territorialization of political power and processes of state formation, (b) the spatial 
division of labour between town and countryside, between north and south, and 
between different regional and national economies, and (c) spatial imaginaries and 
the representation of space. Gramsci did not believe that space exists in itself, 
independently of the specific social relations that construct it, reproduce it, and occur 
within it. As a profoundly relational and practical thinker, he was never tempted by 
such spatial fetishism. Nor did he accept the geographical determinism common in 
the nineteenth century “scientific” field and still reflected in folklore and common 
sense – a determinism that regards the physical and/or human environment as the 
most important determinant of social relations and their historical development. This 
would have been anathema to Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis too.2 Instead he 
treated space like history, that is, in relational terms. For example, he regarded 
historical grammar (philology) comparatively, refusing to confine its development 
within national boundaries (Ives 1998: 45). He also argued 'that history is always 
"world history" and that particular histories exist only within the frame of world 
history" (Gramsci 1985: 181). This is directly comparable to his view that national 
states are not self-closed ‘power containers’ but should be studied in terms of their 
complex interconnections with states and political forces on other scales. Indeed he 
brings both the temporal and spatial perspectives together in an early form of 
‘geographical historical materialism’ (cf. Harvey 1982). 
 
Scale comprises the nested (and sometimes not so nested) hierarchy of bounded 
spaces of differing size, e.g., local, regional, national, global. Scale is the product of 
social struggles for power and control. Gramsci was extremely sensitive to issues of 
scale, scalar hierarchies of economic and political power, and their territorial and 
non-territorial expressions. Thus he conducted national analyses from an 
international viewpoint (e.g, the European bourgeoisie aimed to become the leading, 
dominant class throughout the Continent); he located the Italian revolution in a 
European context, focusing on Piedmont's attempt to emulate the French 
bourgeoisie's catalytic role in Europe and to help shape a European historical bloc. 
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He also analyzed hegemonic relations at the local level, noting, for example, how the 
urban bloc around Paris dominated other French cities; how Giolitti attempted to 
form an urban bloc between the northern bourgeoisie and proletariat that could 
exercise hegemony over the southern Italian rural bloc; and how the modern 
automobile city of Turin was a healthy and productive but the heavy industrial cities 
of Lombardy were corrupted by clientelism (Gramsci 1977: 150-3; Portelli 1973: 83-
4; Levy 1999: 192). Arguments about different scales of economic, political, 
intellectual, and cultural organization were also central to his other analyses of 
historical blocs and, indeed, for individual identity formation. In the latter regard, for 
example, he noted that Pirandello identified himself as local, national, and European 
and could only become an Italian and national writer because he had 
deprovincialized himself and become European (1985: 000). Indeed, far from 
affirming that there is a simple ‘nested hierarchy’ of scales from the local to the 
global with distinct sets of economic, political, and social relations on each scale, 
Gramsci he was especially sensitive to the ways in which tangled hierarchies of 
scale acted as a source of economic, political, and socio-economic instability.  
 
Scale dominance is 'the power which organizations at certain spatial scales are able 
to exercise over organizations at other, higher or lower scales' (Collinge 1999: 568). 
It can derive from the general relationship among different scales considered as 
strategically selective terrains of power and domination and/or from the features 
characteristics, capacities, and activities of organizations located at different scales. 
One or more scales can gain special socio-political significance by playing the 
dominant role in the scale division of labour among different social institutions. In 
turn, nodal scales are non-dominant overall but nonetheless serve as the primary 
loci for delivering certain activities in a given spatio-temporal order or matrix 
(Collinge 1999: 569). Finally, subaltern scales are marginal or peripheral but may 
also become sites of resistance.  
 
Gramsci operates implicitly with such distinctions in analyzing historical and 
contemporary patterns of domination. For example, he can be interpreted as arguing 
that, within the nested (or, better, tangled hierarchy) of scales in Italian state- and 
nation-building, the national level was nodal rather than dominant. In a period when 
the primacy of the national scale – economically, politically, socio-culturally – was 
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increasingly taken for granted, at least in the advanced capitalist societies of the 
‘West’. For Gramsci lived in a conjuncture when, Italia fatta, bisogna fare gli Italiani 
(Italy being made, we must make the Italians). In short, whatever the general 
importance of the national scale in the international state system, Italy was weakly 
integrated domestically and the national scale had not yet become dominant over 
local and regional scales.  
 
Nor was Gramsci unaware of the international weakness of the Italian state and the 
influence of external factors on its development. For example, the Vatican was not 
just a local religious institution but a source of Italy’s place in the larger world, with 
Catholicism functioning as a worldwide hegemonic institution, as an imperialistic 
spirit" (1995: 220-1; cf. Saunders 1998: 181). He was therefore disinclined to regard 
the national state as the basic unit of international relations. He also recognized the 
distinction between dominant and nodal scales on a continental as opposed to the 
world scale. Concerning European and World politics, for example, he wrote: 
 
These two are not the same thing. In a duel between Berlin and Paris or 
between Paris and Rome, the winner is not master of the world. Europe has 
lost its importance and world politics depends more on London, Washington, 
Moscow, Tokyo than it does on the Continent. (1995: 374). 
 
Thus his analyses of struggles for national hegemony were not confined to the 
national but closely examined the articulation and, indeed, interpenetration, of the 
local, regional, national, and supranational scales. Moreover, Gramsci often 
commented on the ‘strategic selectivities’ associated with the dissociation of scales 
across different institutional orders and/or the possibilities of scale jumping (e.g., the 
history of Italian intellectuals, the disjunction between the increasing formation of the 
world market and the continued survival of national states). Likewise, he predicted 
that the diffusion of both Americanism and Fordism (so that they were mutually 
supportive) could transform economic, political, and socio-cultural relations in 
Europe. He also identified and elaborated the need for new forms of interscalar 
articulation to form a new historic bloc and mobilize multiple social forces (e.g., in 
order to resolve the Southern Question or to enable the Soviet Union to break out of 
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the isolation produced by Stalin’s policy of ‘socialism in one country’). And, reflecting 
in particular on the experience of the Italian intellectuals, he notes that: 
 
Since every national complex is an often heterogeneous combination of 
elements, it may happen that its intellectuals, because of their 
cosmopolitanism, do not coincide with the national content, but with a content 
borrowed from other national complexes or even with a content that is abstract 
and cosmopolitan (1985: 205). 
 
Gramsci’s interests in place, space, and scale are combined in investigations on a 
wide range of topics. I cannot examine them all below but they include: (a) the social 
constitution of categories such as ‘North-South’ and ‘East’ and ‘West’, their reflection 
of the viewpoint European cultured classes, their ideological representation of 
differences between civilizations, and their material significance in practical life 
(Gramsci 1971: 810); (b) the strategic selectivities associated with the dissociation of 
scales across different institutional orders and/or the possibilities of scale jumping, 
e.g., the cosmopolitanism and external orientation of traditional intellectuals in Italy 
from Imperial Rome to the contemporary Catholic Church based in Rome and their 
impact of Italian and European politics; (c) the medieval communes and their 
economic-corporate urban regimes; (d) relationships between town/city and 
countryside and their geographical modalities in different countries; (e) the tangled 
hierarchy of scales as a source of economic, political, and socio-economic instability 
(e.g., Piedmont); (f) new forms of interscalar articulation to form a new historic bloc 
and mobilize multiple social forces (e.g., in order to resolve the Southern Question); 
(g) the reconstruction of scale in response to the crisis of liberalism, dependent 
development and internal colonialism, and the rise of Americanism and Fordism; (h)  
imperialism and imperialist rivalries within the context of a hierarchy of advanced 
capitalist, semi-advanced, and peripheral capitalist states (e.g., England and 
Germany, France and Czechoslovakia, and Italy respectively (Ghosh 2001: 3-4); and 
(j) the possibility of revolution in advanced capitalist states (the ’West’) following the 
Russian Revolution (in the ’East’). More generally, Gramsci was interested in the 
relative coherence of different scales of economic and political organization and their 
social and cultural presuppositions. For example, in a familiar argument in Marxist 
analyses of the world market and imperialism, Gramsci remarks that: 
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 One of the fundamental contradictions is this: that whereas economic life has 
internationalism, or better still cosmopolitanism, as a necessary premiss, 
state life has developed ever more in the direction of ‘nationalism’, of ‘self-
sufficiency’ and so on (1995:  353). 
 
Gramsci and the Southern Question 
 
The Southern Question was posed in many ways as a central problem in Italian 
state- and nation-building. Gramsci analyses these twin processes in terms of the 
‘passive revolution’ that occurred as the Italian northern bourgeoisie sought to 
unify the peninsular in the face of a heterogeneous and divided population and 
vast regional disparities (Davis 1982; Morera 1990: 149). Italy’s weak economic, 
political, and social integration and the lack of dominance of the national scale 
inform Gramsci’s early political writings, the ‘Lyons Theses’ (co-authored with 
Togliatti), and his incomplete essay on ‘Some Aspects of the Southern Question’ 
(1926). These discuss three issues: (a) the complex, multi-layered economic and 
political subordination of secondary centres of accumulation to the north and their 
implications for class alliances; (b) the resulting complexities of class formation 
and regional disparities structures that block a Jacobin road to national unification; 
and (c) the problems this poses for the leading role of the proletariat, which is ‘a 
minority of the working population and geographically distributed in such a 
manner, that it cannot presume to lead a victorious struggle for power unless it 
has previously resolved very precisely the problem of its relations with the peasant 
class’ (1977:  329). Thus, in their Lyons Theses, Gramsci and Togliatti write: 
 
Industrialism, which is the essential part of capitalism, is very weak in Italy. Its 
possibilities for development are limited, both because of the geographical 
situation and because of the lack of raw materials. It therefore does not 
succeed in absorbing the majority of the Italian population (4 million industrial 
workers exist side by side with 3½ million agricultural workers and 4 million 
peasants). To industrialism, there is counterposed an agriculture which 
naturally presents itself as the basis of the country’s economy. The extremely 
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varied conditions of the terrain, and the resulting differences in cultivation and 
in systems of tenancy, however, cause a high degree of differentiation among 
the rural strata, with a prevalence of poor strata, nearer to the conditions of the 
proletariat and more liable to be influenced by it and accept its leadership. 
Between the industrial and agrarian classes, there lies a fairly extensive urban 
petty bourgeoisie, which is of very great significance. It consists mainly of 
artisans, professional men and State employees (1978: 343). 
 
Gramsci takes this theme up again in his essay on the Southern Question. He claims 
that the capacity of the Italian proletariat, which is a minority class and 
geographically concentrated in the north, to become the leading (dirigente) and 
dominant class depends on its capacity to form class alliances, mobilizing in 
particular the real consent and active support of the broad peasant masses (1978; 
1977: 328-9). But he adds the peasant question is historically determined in Italy; it is 
not the “peasant and agrarian question in general”. In Italy the peasant question, 
through the specific Italian tradition, and the specific development of Italian history, 
has taken two typical and particular forms – the Vatican and Southern Questions 
(1978: 443; cf. 1977: 328-9). 
 
This argument, his earlier analyses, and his Prison Notebooks all involve a deeply 
spatialized rather than a-spatial analysis of classes, social categories, and political 
forces. Gramsci identified five forces crucial forces in postwar Italy: (1) the northern 
urban force; (2) the southern rural force; (3) the northern/central rural force; (4) the 
rural force of Sicily; and (5) the rural force of Sardinia. And, on this basis, he 
analyzed the inter-regional relations on the analogy of a train whose engine would be 
the northern urban force (cf. Morera 1990: 89). The key question then becomes 
which other forces should be mobilized by this locomotive to effect a rapid and 
successful path to communism. Accordingly he recommended that the communist 
party promote a hegemonic alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry and petty-
bourgeois intellectuals and lead them in a war of position before the final military-
political resolution of the conflict. This would dissolve the defensive alliance between 
northern industrialists and southern landowners, which also benefited from rural and 
urban petty-bourgeois support.  
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Gramsci on Americanism and Fordism 
 
Gramsci’s vernacular materialism significantly frames his views on economic issues. 
Rejecting classical and vulgar political economy as well economic liberalism and 
economistic Marxism, he emphasized the broad historical location and specific 
spatio-temporal specificities of economic organization and economic regularities. 
This is why he substituted the notion of mercato determinato (definite forms of 
organizing and regulating market relations with associated laws of tendency) for 
transhistorical economic analysis based on the actions of rational economic man. 
Thus he explored dependent development in the Mezzogiorno and the general 
tendency towards internal colonialism in Italy; the interrelations between different 
economic places and spaces, including geographical variations in relationships 
between town and country and how different parties aimed to remodel this 
relationship (Gramsci 1971 269); and the interconnection, articulation, and real or 
potential tensions between local, regional, national, international and transnational 
economies. He was well-attuned to the spatial division of labour, the importance of 
scale in an emerging world market, and the conflict between place and space. And 
he analyzed the class relations that follow from the spatiality of economic 
organization. In short, as Morera, an acute interpreter of Gramsci’s ‘absolute 
historicism’, argues ‘Gramsci not only rejected sociology for abstracting from time 
conditions, but also from space. That is, from the geographical conditions of social 
processes’ (Morera 1990: 89).  
 
Turning to international economic relations, he attacked liberalism for taking the 
nation-state as its horizon of economic policy-making and assuming that the world 
economy could safely be left to market regulation (Vacca 1997: 160). Gramsci 
remarked upon the growing contradiction between cosmopolitanism in the world 
market and the nationalism of political life – which has to be the starting point for any 
move to internationalism in the revolutionary socialist movement. Gramsci was 
interested in the dynamics of uneven and combined development in an emerging 
global capitalism. His notes on Americanism and Fordism explored how the centre of 
economic dynamism was moving from old Europe to the United States and was 
prompting Europe to adapt. He did not adopt a narrowly economically-determinist 
view of American economic progress – let alone a simplistic technological 
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determinism. Instead he examined the specific historical and material conditions that 
had enabled a new techno-economic paradigm to develop there, including the 
establishment of an economia programmatica at the level of the enterprise, the 
factory town, and the wider society. The originality and significance of Fordism as 
accumulation regime, mode of regulation, and way of life hindered its diffusion to 
Europe because this required more than the export of technical means of production 
and a technical division of labour. Nonetheless, to the extent that it did spread to 
Europe, it also facilitated the hegemony of American imperialism.   
 
In contrast to the Comintern, Gramsci emphasized the shift in the centre of economic 
gravity from Europe to the USA, which had developed a more rationally organized 
economy. If workers could take the lead in adopting this model, it could become the 
basis for working class to guide world historical development (Vacca 1999: 9; Baratta 
1997). But he also asked prophetically whether the centre of gravity might shift 
again, this time from the Atlantic to the Pacific.  
 
The largest masses of the world’s population are in the Pacific. If China and 
India were to become modern nations with great volumes of industrial 
production, their consequent detachment from a dependency on Europe would 
in fact rupture the current equilibrium: transformation of the American continent, 
shift in the axis of American life from the Atlantic to the Pacific seaboard, etc. 
(1971: 326) 
 
Gramsci on Territoriality and the State  
 
Gramsci did not naturalize or fetishize national territory as the pre-given or pre-
destined basis of state formation – and could not have done, indeed, given the 
historical problems of nation formation that he recognized and that he also struggled 
to overcome. The territorialization of political power is a crucial first material step in 
national state formation and nation building..3 It is unsurprising, then, that Gramsci 
studied the problems of the transition from medieval communes to absolutism and 
thence to a bourgeois liberal democratic state (e.g., Italy vs the Netherlands) and the 
need to break out of the economic-corporate phase with its political fragmentation. 
“The chief defect of previous Italian history was not class oppression but the 
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absence of definite class formation, due to the fact that ‘in Italy political, territorial 
and national unity enjoy a scanty tradition (or perhaps no tradition at all)’ (Gramsci 
1971 274). Gramsci was also aware that territorial unity did not itself ensure political 
unity. This is apparent in his contrast between Bodin and Machiavelli:  
 
Bodin lays the foundations of political science in France on a terrain which is 
far more advanced and complex than that which Italy offered to Machiavelli. 
For Bodin the question is not that of founding the territorially united (national) 
State – i.e., of going back to the time of Louis XI – but of balancing the 
conflicting social forces within this already strong and well-implanted State. 
Bodin is interested in the moment of consent, not in the moment of force 
(Gramsci 1971: 344) 
 
Securing political unity also requires the institutional integration of the state through 
appropriate state forms, its embedding in the wider ensemble of societal relations, 
and its capacity to engage in relatively unified action through appropriate state and 
national-popular projects. As symptoms of a failed national unification project in Italy, 
he regularly cited the Vatican and Southern Questions and the passive revolution 
that occurred under the domination of Piedmont and the Moderate Party. And, in one 
of his most famous comparisons in state theory, he claims that: 
 
‘In the East the state was everything, civil society was primordial and 
gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between state and civil 
society, and when the state trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at 
once revealed’ (1971: 000). 
 
This approach raised crucial issues concerning passive revolution, hegemony, and 
the historical bloc. Gramsci provides many other examples of problems in the 
mechanisms in and through which political unity is created and identifies an 
enormous variability in its forms – ranging from sheer coercion through force-fraud-
corruption and passive revolution to an inclusive hegemony. Nor did he see this 
mainly as a question of public administration or reform of the state apparatus – it was 
deeply related to the social bases of the state. He therefore introduced a rich 
conceptual instrumentarium for analyzing class relations: ruling class, governing 
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class, governing party, class in charge of the state, the political class, functionaries 
as an intermediary stratum with the task of linking people and state, subaltern 
classes, class alliance, class compromise, and so forth.  
 
Moreover, in developing his analyses, he did not regard classes as disembedded, 
free-floating entities but noted the impact of their spatial as well as social roots. This 
in turn implies the spatiality as well as the historicity of the state as a social relation.  
 
The chief defect of Italian intellectuals was not that they formed a powerful and 
resilient ‘‘cultural hegemony’’, but that, because they were cosmopolitan rather 
than national, no authentic hegemony had ever been realised. Like the artificial 
or perverted state hegemony of Piedmont, the cultural tradition deriving from 
the Renaissance humanists could provide only a weak and eccentric form of 
hegemony, because it was not national’ (Ghosh 2001: 36). 
 
Gramsci and International Relations  
 
Although Gramsci regrets the failure of the Italian nation-state compared with 
France’s successful Jacobin state-building project, he is well aware that even this 
took decades to accomplish and that contemporary nation-states were being forged 
in a much changed and deeply contested international context. For example, he 
suggests that, whereas Versailles re-established the prerogatives of nation-states, 
the Bolshevik world revolution project aimed at an eventual society of nations. After 
Versailles, the nation could no longer remain, if it ever had fully been, the dominant 
horizon of state life. Thus it was crucial to analyze how the internal balance of forces 
was overdetermined by international forces and a country’s geo-political position and 
to assess whether and how the latter balance modifies domestic forces, reinforcing 
or breaking progressive and revolutionary movements (Gramsci 1971: 304). He 
therefore deemed it ‘necessary to take into account the fact that international 
relations intertwine with these internal relations of nation-states, creating new, 
unique and historically concrete combinations’ (1971: 406). He also noted that 
winning international hegemony was partly an educational relationship, affecting 
complexes of national and continental civilizations (1971: 666). This applied not only 
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to Americanism and Fordism but also to the role of the international communist 
movement and its involvement in united front activities. 
 
When exploring the international dimensions of economic, political, and socio-
cultural relations, Gramsci did not assume that the basic units of international 
relations were national economies, national states, or nationally-constituted civil 
societies. Thus he saw the Vatican not just as a local religious institution but, as a 
form of religious imperialism, a worldwide hegemonic institution (Gramsci 1985: 220-
1; Saunders 1998: 181). More generally, he explored the mutual implications of 
nested scales of economic and political organization, their social and cultural 
presuppositions, and the consequences of the dissociation of the dominant scales of 
economic and political life. This made him sensitive to the complexities of interscalar 
relations and he never assumed that they were ordered in a simple nested hierarchy.  
 
Gramsci’s approach to international relations is interesting for six reasons. First, in 
whereas Marx mainly developed an abstract-simple analysis of the capitalist mode of 
production, Gramsci took this analysis for granted and focused instead on concrete 
conjunctures in emerging and developed capitalist social formations in a world 
shaped by imperialism and the Bolshevik Revolution. Second, Gramsci integrated 
his analysis of base and superstructure with concrete political analyses. This was a 
key element in his concept of historical bloc and his systematic concern with the role 
of intellectuals in mediating these relations (see, for example, Portelli 1972). This 
analysis extended beyond the national scale to the international (e.g., his analyses of 
Americanism and Fordism and its diffusion in Europe or his concern with the 
Bolshevik Revolution’s failure to spread from the ‘East’ to the ‘West’). Third, in 
opposing economism both theoretically and politically, Gramsci showed the role of 
political and civil society in constituting and reproducing economic relations on 
scales up to and including the international. Fourth, in contrast to (neo-)realism in 
more recent international relations theory, Gramsci did not fetishize the nation-state 
as the basic unit or scale of analysis. Indeed his work could be interpreted as a 
protracted reflection on ‘the failure of the Italian state to constitute itself as a national 
state – a failure that reflects the laborious emergence of a modern Italian nation, 
impeded by a balance of internal and international forces’ (1985: 335).  
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Fifth, writing during and after the Great War with its inter-imperialist rivalries and 
open hostility between the capitalist bloc and the fledgling Soviet Union, Gramsci 
was especially concerned with two issues: (a) the international as well as national 
and regional context of the defeat of the working class movement and the rise of 
fascism; and (b) the spread of Americanism and Fordism as the basis for 
modernization in Italy and Europe more generally. Thus, in contrast to the 
Comintern, Gramsci emphasized the shift in the centre of economic gravity from 
Europe to the USA, which had developed a more rationally organized economy, 
which could in turn become the basis for working class to guide world historical 
development (Vacca 2000: 9; Baratta 1997). Sixth, he was strongly interested in 
international relations and studied work on geo-politics and demo-politics (which 
would now be called bio-politics) to better understand the political implications of the 
international balance of forces.  
 
In this context, and in contrast to the methodological nationalism that still affects 
much thinking on international relations, Gramsci did not draw a rigid distinction 
between the national and the international but explored issues of interscalar 
articulation and reciprocal influence in a more complex and dialectical manner.  
 
‘Do international relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental social 
relations? There can be no doubt that they follow. Any organic innovation in 
the social structure, through its technical-military expressions, modifies 
organically absolute and relative relations in the international field too. Even 
the geographical position of a national State does not precede but follows 
(logically) structural changes, although it also reacts back upon them to a 
certain extent (to the extent precisely to which superstructures react upon 
the structure, politics on economics, etc.). However, international relations 
react both passively and actively on political relations (of hegemony among 
the parties)’ (1971: 398) 
.  
Gramsci explores the links between economic, political, and international strategy in 
his analysis of the inter-linkage between domestic class alliances and foreign 
economic policy. Italy’s ruling class had to choose between rural democracy based 
on ‘an alliance with the Southern peasants, a policy of free trade, universal suffrage, 
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administrative decentralization and low prices for industrial products’; or ‘a 
capitalist/worker industrial bloc, without universal suffrage, with tariff barriers, with 
the maintenance of a highly centralized State (the expression of bourgeois dominion 
over the peasants, especially in the South and the Islands), and with a reformist 
policy on wages and trade–union freedoms’ (1978: 607). As Gramsci then 




Gramsci not only emphasized the historical specificity of all social relations but was 
also less explicitly attuned to their distinctive location in place, space, and scale. 
Thus almost all of his crucial concepts are sensitive to issues of place, space, and 
scale as well as to issues of periodization, historical structures, specific conjunctures, 
and social dynamics. Whether we consider the relations of production, the 
determined market (mercato determinato), the contrast between the dynamism of 
Americanism and Fordism and the relative stagnation of European and Soviet 
planned economies, the forms of class relations (economically, politically, 
intellectually), the territoriality of state formation and the relative strengths or 
weakness of specific states (considered both in terms of political and civil society), 
the spatial roots of intellectuals and their different functions in economic, political, 
and moral organization, the nature of political alliances, the appropriate forms of 
economic-corporate, political, and military strategy, etc., Gramsci emerges as a 
spatial thinker as much as he does as an historical thinker. This is rooted in his 
profoundly historicist concern with the spatio-temporality of all social relations. In 
addition, Gramsci’s analysis of strategy was objectively as well as metaphorically 
sensitive to temporality and spatiality. Not only did Gramsci emphasize the 
interweaving of different temporalities into complex conjunctures and situations and 
search for the openings between a path-dependent present and possible futures. But 
he also regarded strategy as inherently spatial. He was always aware of the need to 
mobilize in and across specific places, spaces, and scales, each with their own 
distinctive determinations and strategic selectivities. At stake in both cases is the 
transformation of spatio-temporal horizons of action and the interweaving of different 
temporalities and spatialities. It is only in this context that his notions of war of 
position and war of manoeuvre make sense. For Gramsci’s interest in place, space, 
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and scale was not merely academic but had to do with his analysis of revolutionary 
conjunctures. Thus he argues that a collective will must be formed ‘with the degree 
necessary and sufficient to achieve an action which is co-ordinated and 
simultaneous in the time and the geographical space in which the historical event 
takes place’ (1971 426-7). In short, his comments on the political failures of left 
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Endnotes 
 
1 For Said, Gramsci offered ‘an essentially geographical, territorial apprehension of 
human history and society … far more than Lukács he was political in the practical 
sense, conceiving of politics as a contest over territory, both actual and historical, to 
be won, fought over, controlled, held, lost, gained’ (2001: 464). 
2 While Gramsci argues that natural resources and landscapes constrain as well as 
facilitate social practice, this does not involve monocausal determinism. Indeed, as 
Pandolfi notes, his 'vision of territory differed from the dangerous and arrogant 
categorizations of some proponents of the Southern Question, and he was careful to 
dissociate himself from their essentialism. Such geographical determinisms … only 
legitimated the authoritarian and imperialistic stances of the North. Rather, 
territoriality was a political perimeter; it referred to a peripheral place subject to 
imperial and strategic domination by the center' (1998: 286). 
3 Gramsci notes how Rudolf Kjellén, a Swedish sociologist, sought to ‘construct a 
science of the state and of politics on a new basis, taking as his starting point the 
territorial unit as organised politically (development of the geographical sciences—
physical geography, anthropography, geo-politics) and the mass of human beings 
living in society on that territory (geo-politics and demopolitics)’ (1995: 325). 
 
